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DE(MA)CRACY

When we think about democracy nowadays, we think about many people (most of the time millions) who live together peacefully in a functioning system within a territory defined by borders. For many, this definition may be radically underdetermined and not at all sufficient. Even if we ignore the legitimacy of these borders and the genealogy of a so-called nation-state, or in other words: if we ignore the *naissance* of the nation and the contingency of its current extension, we are still left with the question of what “living peacefully together” means. More importantly, we must ask who has the right to live within these borders and on what reasons this is based.

But following a different thread, we would like to ask which role do these millions of people have in the permeance, the current order, and the ongoing *naissance* of what is called “democratic.” It is no coincidence that democracy is no Plethocracy. *Πληθους* stands for a sizeable, hardly controllable crowd. Such a crowd came into existence at the end of the 18th century. The symbolic head of the doctrine of divine right was beheaded while the monarch’s throne was extended and became a political stage. The crowd became a political actor and was called *δημος*. But what is the difference between *πληθους* and *δημος*? Which criteria enable the distinguishment between crowds and people? The passport, place of birth, ideology, rationality, or something else? And who are these people who say: “We are the nation,” claiming to be the Lord of this territory called nation-state?

Claude Lefort in his influential essay “The question of democracy”¹ describes the transformation of politics happening with the French Revolution as a phenomenon where the locus of power becomes empty.² Central to Lefort’s argument is the disembodiment of power. Before the revolutionary crowd formed, only the monarch could legitimately rule the country. The reason that the monarch was given his power was that he was God’s representative on Earth. Widely known from Hobbes’s picture of the Leviathan, the monarch was the head of the massive body of the nation’s people. According to Lefort, by cutting the Monarch’s head off, not only was the biological body of Ludwig XVI eliminated but so was the transcendent reasoning of the

¹ Originally this text was in German. So, because this source and some other was not available in English, the German one will be used. In the following we will refer to this footnote, if another source of this kind will be used.

² Claude Lefort, “Die Frage der Demokratie”, in *Autonome Gesellschaft und libertäre Demokratie* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1990), 293.

monarchy. Thus, the earthly monarch as God's representative on earth lost all his power.

In Lefort's idea, only the lived imagination of a society or a nation survives, and it exists within a territory defined by borders. Because the original head of state was missing, it became necessary to bring up a new head through a political or discursive process. Consequently, the locus of power was no longer located in one body. The legitimization withdrew from the organic, or as we are going to say later, organism and power diverged but remained insolubly tied to each other. Due to this development, Lefort states: "The democratic society finds itself as a society without body."³

Through the constitution of elections aiming at the nomination of a representational government, the substantial head of the nation is replaced with the number, or to be more precise, with the quotient resulting from the election. According to Lefort, it must be emphasized that the elected government does not embody the locus of power because election and nomination have only a temporary function. (They represent interests, at least theoretically.) However, the government must prove itself in the context of ongoing democratic mechanisms (e.g., through protests or indirectly through the permanent danger of a vote of no confidence), and in the regular repetition of elections. Every time the nation is troubled, the legitimacy of the government is challenged.

Every hope for fundamental ground or trial by ordeal is refused. The core problem in democracy then, due to the *κρατος* of the *δημος* and consequently to the locus of power de-territorializing, is the impossibility of a final representation, or in Lefort's terms, of "No-Representation." The solution of an elected government is a quasi-solution because it suspends the problem and in situations of crisis the core problem of "No-Representation" has the potential to appear only on the surface. "Democratic society is a term of a society, in which the foundations of political and social rules are always withdrawing their self".⁴

The democratic society finds itself as a society without body. The word "finds" should be emphasized. Lefort does not say "the democratic society is without a body," but its formation arose from the ruins of collapsed buildings (as Kant puts it in his *Critique of Pure Reason*). In this sense, the democratic society per se transcends the organic dimension to provide itself with an imaginary⁵ unity. The social body consists of many. They do not have one head, one name, one specificity by (organic) origin. Substance and name diverge. The substance is *substantia* and not *essentia*. Although

³ Ibid., 295.

⁴ Ibid., 296.

⁵ As we will outline later, "imaginary" is not understood in the sense of "illusory" but elaborating a new level, namely a level of power and self-interpretation that is in no way less real than the organic level.

nowadays substance and essence are used nearly synonymously in everyday language, we must strongly insist on a distinction in this text. *Substantia* came, according to Heidegger, from *υποστασις* which originally meant “ground” or “that what is permanent.” *Essentia* on the other hand is expressed through a category of speech and is a kind of quintessence. “It is that by which something becomes what it is”.⁶ *Essentia* denotes; it creates something out of anything. This creation is not arbitrary. It is conditioned by different faculties with different laws. The first example which comes to mind is the Kantian distinction between the senses and cognition and how the cognition forms the given matter through the senses, by the affection of the environment.

But this should not be the focus. We just want to emphasize a *hiatus* between essence and substance. If organic matter is the substance, it has in itself some kind of sense. Matter transcends itself in its permanently being matter. It folds itself upon its organic folding. One way of being matter is to give oneself a name. In this denotation anything becomes something. Organic matter writes a name in its center. An example of such an expressive exposition of matter could be what we call “democracy,” (*Ereignis*) which always comes along with a certain experience or better experiences. Under this horizon, democracy is always de(ma)cracy. That what makes *δημος* matter, is *matter* (ma) in its polymorphic ways, which always touches by its expressing and therefore deterritorializing characteristics, the specific borders of being together, i.e., of society itself. If democracy is always de(ma)cracy, then the *κρατος* is an expression of this idiomatic tension between *δημος* and *πληθος*: between nation and crowd or between essence and substance. In the following section we will explore a deduction of this term “de(ma)cracy.” The deduction is no logical exercise, like the syllogistic conclusion is, but a deduction in the Kantian manner. In *Critique of Pure Reason* he calls deduction a “judgment [in front of a] court” where the reasoned legitimation for the use of a term is articulated.⁷

We have claimed that matter is the necessary condition for a democracy. Accordingly, the urgent question is this one: “What is matter?” How do we determine its quintessence? We will try a homonymous differentiation here. We suppose that a text is not a clearly defined entity but that its corpus is matter through a chiasm of traces, detours, backsteps, and contradictions. This implies that the “what” we are asking about, with its general form of “What is...,” is initially a vague grasp. What we grasp is not a clear glimpse of something but

⁶ Saint Thomas Aquinas, *On Being and Essence*, 2nd revised edition, Mediaeval Sources in Translation (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1968), 7.

⁷ Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* (Waiheke Island : Floating Press 2009), 777.

an unexpected unclarity. The unclarity clearly opens in the questioning, "What is...," a pathos that also bears the name "philosophy" and gives grounds to transcend the unclarity. In this context, Derrida invites us to see in the expression "to give grounds" the threat for the a-subjective logic, where the grounds are no product of the action of an autonomous subject that is passed to the receiver. Rather, the grounds are a logic of an anonymous opening. And what opens is the possibility of differentiation per se.⁸

With this elaboration it is necessary to introduce a new distinction. Instead of content and form, signifier and signified, intension and extension, we will say content form and expression form. According to Deleuze and Guattari, every something is a stratum constituted in an assemblage of strata. "The epistrata and parastrata subdividing a stratum can be considered strata themselves (so that the list is never exhaustive)."⁹ A stratum is always intertwined in subdivision(s) and a "stratum, considered from the standpoint of its unity of composition, therefore exists only in its substantial epistrata, which shatter its continuity, fragment its ring and break it down into gradations."¹⁰

The stratum has a specific form of order and organization out of which there emerges something like a content or, in other words, that which makes it what it is. The quintessence is unthinkable in abstraction of the specific assemblage of strata where the stratum is located. Content and form are genuinely intertwined, so abstracting them would be the abstraction of the stratum itself.

The stratum being part of an assemblage builds its necessary condition of existence. It consolidates. Consequently, the border of a stratum is not just a line but a threshold. It is an inter-stratum. Every touching of strata matters an interstratum which becomes a locus of expression matter that also has a specific form. To have it in political terms: the interstratum is the place where the borders are negotiated. We must understand all of this from a perspective of dynamics rather than of statics. There is an ongoing process of affinity for connection, with a tendency of every stratum for and against specific connections. The strata are in a permanent flux. This flux becomes visible by the interstrata where a permanent intermezzo of expression (deterritorialization) and intension (reterritorialization) happens.¹¹

It would be a mistake to believe that it is possible to isolate this unitary, central layer of the stratum, or to grasp it in itself, by regression. In the first place, a stratum necessarily goes from layer to layer, and from

⁸ Cf. Footnote 1. Jacques, Derrida, "Chora" in *Über den Namen* (Wien: Passagen Verlag, 2000).

⁹ Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (London: Athlone Press, 1988),

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 50f.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 53.

the very beginning it already has several layers. It goes from a center to a periphery, at the same time as the periphery reacts back upon the center to form a *new* center in relation to a new periphery. Flows constantly radiate towards the outward, then turn back.¹²

In this sense, what is matter? Stratum, assemblage, intermezzo? Or just expression matter? We must differentiate. There are at least two distinct meanings. On the one hand, matter could be bio-physical matter, which is a substratum or carrier of weight (or, as Newton puts it, the force is the product of a matter's mass and the differential of movement). On the other hand, matter could result in crowds and therefore emerge as social phenomena. In this connotation matter evolves as a *πληθος*.¹³ According to our aim of deducing "de(ma)cracy", we intend to show that the bio-physical matter is the *Existential*¹⁴ of the social phenomena of crowds. Only through the necessary condition that every life needs a body, something like the crowd could emerge.

Two things are crucial. Varela's and Maturana's notion of the autopoietic should help us to describe the characteristics of what we called bio-physical matter. Canetti's understanding of crowds in *Crowds and Power* will be the foundation of the second one (crowds). It helps us to see the crowd in the light of a higher dimension of unformed matter. We have decided for Canetti here because his text manifests an archeological force. This potent revealing is needed due to the western analysis of crowds.

We get a hint at that problem from Canetti himself: "The plural meaning of every social phenomenon is that plural you can interpret how you like. None the less, the most insufficient approach is the fixation and exhaustion of social phenomena as functions."¹⁵ With reference to this idea, Lüdemann tries to show that French conceptualizations from the 19th century trying to grasp crowds psychologically as well as German approaches trying to decrypt crowds social-cybernetically are deemed to failure because "The term 'crowd' [...] stands is on the edge between psychology and sociology and questions the idea of an autonomous individual as well as of the functionally differentiated society."¹⁶

¹² Ibid., 50.

¹³ This deduction mainly derived from the German meaning of "mass (Masse)", which may refer to both, an unformed matter that has physical weight, and a crowd. Any translation into to English faces some difficulties here. However, as we will see during this text, the crowd could be seen as some kind of "higher" dimension of unformed matter. Nonetheless, it could lead to a misunderstanding if one understands "unformed matter" in a strong sense, as though matter was a kind of *υλη* that gets a *μορφη* from outside. Contrary to this, idea we want to elaborate a concept according to which matter consolidates itself by some concrete so-being (*οθσια*) through its own potencies that actualizes through interaction with an environment.

¹⁴ Here we refer to the Heideggerian notion and distinction between Existence (*Existenz*) and Existential (*Existenzial*). (cf. Heidegger 1996, 47).

¹⁵ Elias Canetti, *Die Provinzen des Menschen* (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1986), 286. Cf. footnote 1.

¹⁶ Susanne Lüdemann, „Zusammenhanglose Bevölkerungshaufen, aller inneren Gliederung bar. Die Masse als das Andere der Ordnung im Diskurs der Soziologie“. *Behemoth A Journal of Civilization* 1:115. Cf. footnote 1.

If we characterize *Crowds and Power* as having archeological force, we believe that in the following some threads in this text we will be able to reveal crucial dynamics of the phenomena of crowds. So, we rely on Lüdemann's and Canetti's intuition for every analysis of crowds that only sees a bare bursting out of animal-like irrationality or declares it an expression of a deficient system (until now) which is strikingly underdetermined.

Prelude

Let us begin with bio-physical matter. First, we need take a short detour. If we look at the prominent concepts of the state of nature in political theory we see a variety of ideas such as the war of all against all, or the idea of an original paradise that got denatured by the emergence of social structures, just to name two of the well-known ideas of Hobbes and Rousseau. But all these ideas rely on the autonomous individual being the atom of their conceptual molecule. We always find the idea of independently functioning atoms forging social bonds in situations of naturally conditioned resource shortage (Hobbes) or in shortages due to natural disasters (Rousseau).¹⁷

But this idea of an individual being as a self-enclosed and functioning atom for social molecules, which is more or less analogous to the idea of the modern (rational) subject, should now be questioned with Varela's and Maturana's idea of the "autopoiesis." In their book *Tree of Knowledge*, they structure the development of the living into three stages. First is the molecular manifold, second is the rise of cells, and third is the development of meta-cellularity.¹⁸ Because "the potential diversification and plasticity was made possible, the formation of networks of reactions [which] set the boundaries of the space within which they are formed".¹⁹ Their diversification and plasticity built and build the foundation for the second stage. Plastic structures are characterized by their dynamic harmony. Harmony here is achieved through permanent structural change. In this milieu there emerged the first living beings. Varela and Maturana define them as consistent multitudes. As an organic network of a molecular manifoldness, they are separated from the environment by a border that is a threshold, an *interstratum*.

The [...] membrane not only limits the extension of the transformation network that produced its own components but its participants in this network. If it was not for this [sic!] spatial arrangement, the cell metabolism

¹⁷ At this point it would be possible to ask, if Hobbes's conception could be identified with the psychological analysis of masses and Rousseau's idea with the sociological.

¹⁸ H.R., Maturana, F.J. Varela, und J.Z. Young. *Tree of Knowledge: The Biological Roots of Human Understanding* (Boulder CO: Shambhala, 1992), 74 f.)

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 39f.

would disintegrate into a molecular mess [...] on the one hand, we see a network of dynamic transformations that produces its own components and that is essential for the boundary; on the other hand, we see a boundary that is essential for the operation of the network of transformations which produce it as a unity. [...] The most striking feature of an autopoietic system is that it pulls itself up by its own bootstraps and becomes distinct from its own environment through its own dynamics.²⁰

Two things are crucial in this passage. First, the whole idea starts out from an already existing multitude (the manifoldness of molecules which are in litigious interaction). Second, milieu and organism are connected to each other in a way which is irreducible and constitutes the other (like the stratum, the interstratum, the parastrate and the epistrata being in permanent flux while at the same time expressing a specific unity). The construction (*ποιησις*) of a self (*αυτό*), meaning a functioning unity, is a stratum of different molecules by its transformative interaction and forms a dynamic unity. According to Varela and Maturana this dynamic-adhesive character or the principle of staying-alive-through-adaption builds the foundation of an organism's *conatus*.²¹

In this sense, they distinguish between organization (consistent necessary of relational interdependencies) and structure (concrete relations and elements). The organization itself never comes to light. It is expressed by its structure (content form). Maturana and Varela call this "autonomous unities"²² but neither the *νομος* nor the self (*αυτός*) of this unity were preexistent. There was just a molecular manifoldness which, due to their content forms, showed affinities towards certain connections and an aversion towards others.

Evolution is a natural drift, a product of the conservation of autopoiesis and adaption. [...] [There] is no guiding force needed to explain the directionality of the variations in a lineage [...] Evolution is somewhat like a sculptor with wanderlust: he goes through the world collecting a thread here, a hank of tin there, a piece of wood here, and he combines them in a way made possible by their structure and circumstance [sic!], with no other reason than that he is able to combine them.²³

Out of this evolution of the organism there emerges, through "cellular aggregation"²⁴ the third stage: the metacellular beings. Maturana and Varela call them a "second-order

²⁰ Ibid., 46.

²¹ Ibid., 117.

²² Ibid., 49f.

²³ Ibid., 129.

²⁴ Ibid., 83.

autopoietic system".²⁵ Due to the development of a nervous system, forms of sensibility could emerge. The nervous system is "a tremendously versatile und plastic structure"²⁶ which multiplies the room of possible structural differentiations. Only because of this level of complexity the organism can construct pictures of the environment.

As a reminder, we started with a manifoldness and ended with an organism being able to depict its environment. The manifoldness and the mechanism of reproduction are the reasons for the impossibility of a self to have its own genealogy, but the same self is a product of both, phylogenesis and ontogenesis, that evolve parallel.²⁷ There is always more than one self. Now, in quite an Aristotelian sense of alter ego (*ετερος αυτος*) social phenomena or "third order unities"²⁸ develop through the communication of the depictions of the environment and the resulting structural transformation of the selves (*αυτοι*). Maturana and Varela emphasize that these transformative communications and consequently the building of social assemblages (third order unities) are creations of worlds "brought forth in coexistence [...] through the mechanisms we have described [as autopoiesis and its plastification through cellular or in short through] aggregation".²⁹

Only due to the possibility of communication, which is an interaction between a formed and adhering multi-cellular unity³⁰, does there emerge the dimension of self-interpretation (*Entwurf*). From this standpoint, meta-cellular beings are thrown into an already constituted and created world which tunes them and lets them create their selves. This new dimension transforms the organism's *conatus*. Additionally, it transforms the biological interaction of milieu and organism. Through this we discover a second dimension of activity and behavior in the world. We will call this dimension imaginary, meaning the capacity to produce a depiction of the environment which in turn changes the being of the world. Language is one mode of this imaginary. Consequently, the so-called human experience (and we believe not only there) is a chiasm of biological and imaginary faculties. Articulated words evoke structural changes in the organism, e.g., the release of adrenalin or endorphin, and this in turn changes the perceptibility of the organism. Subsequent affects are perceived and respond in different ways than before. Even perceived words occupy both dimensions, as sound body (*φωνη*) and as meaning (*σημαντικον*).

²⁵ Ibid., 87.

²⁶ Ibid., 138.

²⁷ Ibid., 161ff.

²⁸ Ibid., 195.

²⁹ Ibid., 239.

³⁰ We could also say "intraction", as Barad puts it, and describe the entanglement of cellular entities as a permanent process of becoming matter, from which there emerges something like an organism (Barad 2007). We would be very close to Deleuze's and Guattaris' idea of the stratum. But this should be a reinforcing hint. A reinforcement that makes the cosmos looser, but this is no lost.

We must admit that this distinction between imaginary and biological is primarily heuristic (or maeutic?) with the aim to ground our differentiation between power and potential. Potential describes an organism's ability of transformative interaction with its milieu (plasticity of the organism) which is articulated by a specific affinity for some connections, and in case of an actual connection, its transformative and complex progression in the organism. But only with the ability of self-interpretation (*Entwurf*) there evolves the imaginary dimension of being matter, and as a result there unfolds a field of power (*Macht*).³¹

Reasonably, we applied the term "being matter" by accident. With the idea of the nervous system as a plastic structure we found the dimension of world-creation. Consequently, power and world are not just emotions. They also have a structural or dynamic side. By means of the idea we want to come back to the expression of "natural drift." We recall that Maturana and Varela describe the phylogenetic differentiation of lineage as a natural drift. The actual differentiation of a species is a product of a multitude of organic touches that results in new capacities becoming matter.

The idea of a curvilinear development through infinitesimal differentiations is no revolution. Already the atomists, especially Lucretius, argued that beside the atoms and the emptiness a third element was necessary for the becoming of a planet and a world. They called this *clinamen* and defined it as the infinitesimal change of the straight atom trajectory which leads to the connection of atoms and then onto the building of more complex structures such as molecules, a planet, and organisms. The crucial difference between the idea of *clinamen* and what is usually called coincidence, such as the predictability of the result when throwing a dice, is described by Deleuze and Guattari as the difference between a static (hylomorphic) model of structures and a hydraulic model.³² In a model of solid structures or formed matter there is no room for any drift or differentiation. If there occurs such a drift, the scientific representation of the entity must be insufficient. But in the idea of strata being in a permanent (hydraulic) flux of matter through the chronic repetition of expression and impression, the drift is a necessary consequence. "[T]he atom of the ancients, from Democritus to Lucretius, has always been [sic!] inseparable from hydraulics or a generalized theory of swells and flows."³³

According to these insights, vague matter is what we call the bodies of meta-cellular living beings. The boundary of the

³¹ We want to emphasize at this point: This is not the articulation of a hierarchy of animals or an evolutive taxonomy but just a differentiation by means of the analysis of matter. This is why we insist in heuristics instead of ontology.

³² Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari. 1993, *Tausend Plateaus. Kapitalismus und Schizophrenie* (Berlin: Merve, 1993), 489.

³³ Ibid.

structure can be as exact as we like; if we look at it through a hydraulic, floating lens, we perceive a specific structure only as an instance of a permanent path of syntheses. So, Deleuze and Guattari define the term “vague” by two criteria. First, “it is inseparable from passages to the limit as changes of state, from the process of deformation or transformation that operate in a space-time itself anexact³⁴”. Second, these passages always come along with “expressive and intensive qualities, which can be higher or lower in degree and are produced in the manner of variable effects”.

It is probably helpful to identify Maturana’s and Varela’s concept of “organization” with the passage on the limit, and their version of the “structure” as stratum with expressive and intensive qualities that imply a *νομος* of the self (*αυτο*), and therefore (in accordance with Derrida’s previously mentioned idea) give grounds for experience at all.³⁵ Consequently, vague matter is necessary but it is not a sufficient condition for a stance of language.

Building on that notion of vague matter creating itself in a manifoldness, as well as the autopoiesis being the way in which the manifold becomes matter which leads to more complex structures, we will create with reference to *Crowds and Power* a second perspective on the matter. This is only possible with complexed, stratified, vague matter where the dimension of power and the imaginary are already unfolded. For Canetti, crowds are modern phenomena. Although he also discusses examples from the Egyptian or Roman Empires,³⁶ he focuses in the course of the text, on crowds “in the modern sense of the word”.³⁷ We have always touched this “modern sense” by attributing both an archeological force to *Crowds and Power* and a lack of complexity to the French and German conceptualizations.

Canetti’s own conceptualization³⁸ starts with an anthropological model for which the so called “touch of the unknown”³⁹ is the behavior dominating force. The whole

³⁴ Ibid., 407. “Anexact” refers to concepts in Husserl’s writings. In this context the notion of “anexact” stands for a conception of time and space, that has no reference system. Thus, the criteria “exact” is not applicable at all, because exactness always has to refer to a value or reference system. In former passages Deleuze and Guattari formulate the distinction between molecular and molar. If there is no molarity no dominant order could be found. (ibid., 3).

³⁵ Op. cit., Maturana et. al., 47.

³⁶ Elias Canetti, *Die Provinzen des Menschen* (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1986), 24, 74.

³⁷ Ibid., 112.

³⁸ It would be another topic if this work of Canetti’s could be determined as a concept at all. But this must be discussed elsewhere. Like in our comparison of the hylomorphic and the hydraulic perspective on entities, the question becomes crucial if the objects or phenomena we analyze are considered static or dynamic.

³⁹ Ibid., 7. The translation of “Berührungsfurcht” (Elias Canetti 2021, 13) as fear of “the touch of the unknown” somewhat misses one crucial aspect. If we stay very precise, Canetti does not only talk

segmentation of the human world is grounded in this fear. Everywhere there dominates the desire of taking a distance between oneself and the other: by the arrangement of houses and flats, in restaurants, and in public transport. "Even where we are standing next to [each other] and are able to watch and examine [the other] closely, we avoid contact if we can."⁴⁰ But in crowds this fear vanishes. "Suddenly it is as though everything were happening in one and the same body"⁴¹ It can never be close enough. There is "equality. This is absolute and indisputable and never questioned by the crowd itself. A head is a head, an arm is an arm, differences [...] are irrelevant."⁴² This crowd-body is dominated by a desire to grow and the necessity of a direction. "This direction, which is common to all its members, strengthens the feeling of equality."⁴³ These four characteristics (equality, density, growth, and direction) define the crowd as one being with many heads, many arms, and many legs. By the emergence of crowds, human beings are no longer individuals in the sense of being oneself.

This transformation is not the work of a *deus ex machina*. The origin of the crowd is found in an older unity – the "pack."⁴⁴ Like crowds, packs existed within fixed borders. They consisted of only a few, and if the pack grew, it did not so by discrete quanta and "in mutual agreement of the participants. [...] Density within the pack is always an illusion. Men may press closely together and enact a multitude in traditional rhythmic movements, but they are not a multitude; they are a few, and have to make up in intensity what they lack in actual members."⁴⁵ Canetti argues that the idea and term "pack" (in the German etymology) is rooted in the Latin word "movita" and means "movement".⁴⁶

For a movement to be a movement and not only an unspecific velocity, however, a reference system is also needed. For a pack, a normative order with a consensual set of

about the touch of the unknown but about touch in general. Of course, one could argue that touch per se is the touch of another body and therefore it is in some way unknown. However, this presupposes one's own body to be itself fully known, but I think what Canetti makes possible to discuss by "Berührungsfurcht" is a kind of alienation that occurs with every touch. Even by touching myself, the sensation that arises with myself is somewhat unknown. (And this bodily metaphor may also be transferred to the level of epistemology.) This general characteristic of touch is differentiated if we can touch the "known" and the "unknown".

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Ibid., 14.

⁴² Ibid., 26.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Ibid. 111. At this point it is important to emphasize the many layers in *Crowds and Power*, which by working together and influencing each other create this unique perspective on crowds. But due to this structure there is no presentation of a clear theory you will find by opening the book. But this is no flaw but the opposite. The richness of layers does not lead to incoherence, but in accordance with Canetti, who understands social phenomena as being plurally interpretable, there are many aspects that are entangled, and depending on which aspect you follow, you will find different functions at work. So, in reading *Crowds and Power* you will also have to ask yourself: "From which angle do I want to look at crowds?" Consequently, in a certain sense Canetti's text is a crowd itself or at least a pack that is very context- or rather angle-sensitive.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Ibid. 154.

rules and positions is crucial. Only then we can think of a “mutual agreement of the participants” in case of growth by discrete quanta. Due to habits, norms, and hierarchies, or in short, a social taxonomy, the ground for the movement of a pack is given. Nevertheless, the living members are needed for taxonomy to be taxonomy.

Mutual agreement must not be understood as approval, but rather, affirmation through participation in general. The role a participant plays is constitutive for the pack, but participation in this sense also includes participants having a place in this pack. With their share of the pack, their self extends in the role of the pack. At the same time Canetti paradoxically notes that the participants stop “at its edge”.⁴⁷ The participants remain an involved share. They are ecstatic. They stand through the share of involvement, out of their consolidated selves, but they can deal with this. They do not get absorbed and become new beings. Consequently, in this tension of extension and adherence, one could say in this stretching of oneself that contrary to a crowd the pack is a non-transformative transformation.

In a way, this implies something like an elastic self, and with that we touch the border of the self itself, because what after all stays with an elastic self? Which quality can we attribute? An elastic container like *χωρα* in Plato’s *Timaios*? In the end can we only say, “The identity is identical”? What sounds like a commonplace tautology in the most banal way could be rephrased in the words of the beginning of our text: The identity of the self is the possibility of anything to become something. We are confronted with questions of difference and differentiation, of being as becoming. We also touched it with the distinction between the hylomorphic and the hydraulic. But a real elaboration on that must be postponed to another text.

Nonetheless, we want to stick to the differentiation. A pack is a movement on the verge. It is a turbulence in the threshold between individuals that does not lead to total trans-substantiation. It does not lead to a process of *trans-essenceiation*, a process of denoting themselves as a group. On the contrary, the crowd is exactly this kind of trans-substantiation where every denotation withdraws except total equality, the bare identity itself.

We can state contemporarily: Participation is a phenomenon with two mechanisms which are entangled with each other. Constitutive participation and the extension of the self, due to being a participant. It is a process - and we should not get tired with insisting in that processual character - of subjectification, with every actual subjectification stabilizing the dispositive where it happens. Consequently, the pack requires its own taxonomy, including certain consolidated structures of power.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 111.

Like every quantity requires quantization and like every meaning needs a consolidated segmentation of a manifoldness (to count to ten I need the molar unity of “1”), the “growth by concrete quanta” requires a territorial segmentation of vague matter (individuals). As we have already elaborated, individuals as vague masses of matter are in a process of permanent de-construction, oscillating between expression and impression. As such, segmentation is crucial for vague matter. It even acts in a material-performative manner because it tunes the ability for future becoming. But this should not give the impression of an a priori segmentation. Every thought that wants to identify the foundation between the duality of movement and unity will eventually vanish in a fog line of the ether. (Will *this* prognosis always be true?) However, crowds are affected by this performativity in a different way. According to Canetti, the “discharge”⁴⁸ leads to trans-substantiation, to the formation of a singular being synthesizing the plural individuals. The movement of the pack loses its unity. The quantity of the movement reaches a quantity that changes the quality and thus quantization. It is a transition of the social taxonomy. A crowd emerges. Values, order schemes, or hierarchies of the taxonomy are not only questioned but are overridden or even rolled over. Certainly, they are overruled. Every social taxonomy is only preserved through affirmation, or a permanent reproduction of positions and practices. These reproductions are no simple repetition. They are no *reproductions*, but a persistent investment of energy. In short, they are *reproductions*. (Again, we can see the duality connected to the idea of participation: Through participation, the participant is produced as a participant via integration by way of repeating the scheme of a social taxonomy. But all in the same this integration is a kind of affirmation that is necessary for the preservation of the social taxonomy.) Rancière therefore distinguishes between police and politics. Police is the institutionalized force that ensures the reproduction of an specific “configuration of the perceptible in which one or the other is inscribed”.⁴⁹ The political, on the contrary, questions the extinctions and injustices of this configuration which are integrated in every social taxonomy. It does so in a passive-performative way because they give grounds for an accumulation of sorrow in parts of society.⁵⁰ Rancière himself subsumes sorrow under the formula of the part without a share. Or to put it more politically, the part that has no place. These parts are without a voice (le part de sans-part)⁵¹, which means in our

⁴⁸ Ibid., 7.

⁴⁹ Jacques Rancière, *Disagreement : Politics and Philosophy* (Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press, 2008), 29.

⁵⁰ Ibid. 28.

⁵¹ The translation „part without a voice” is quite vast, closer would be “part of those who have no part”, as is the English version. But this translation and its transported meaning does not really work in the English language because all these formulations in the form “no x” are quite

terminology they are the content of a social taxonomy but have no possibility of expression. In short, they are no stratum but a sub-stratum. Only through transversal differentiations of perception and language is *reproduction* possible, which enables these parts without a voice to participate. Only by transgressing the social taxonomy's configuration there opens the possibility to raise the voice for those parts which had no voice before. Otherwise, the "dispute to do with the counting of the community's parts" is postponed, and meanwhile the current configuration stays as.⁵² One example of such a transgression would be the emergence of modern crowds in the Canettian sense. Because of this we will call them political matter from now on.

With reference to Lefort, we can see an interesting aspect. He states, as we remember, that substance is substituted by quantity, but the unleashed quantity (the transgression from pack to political matter) could vice versa affect the quality and therefore transform the quantization. Packs as structures of vague matter (individuals), with its characteristics of *reproduction* and *reproduction*, differs crucially from political matter. There is a hiatus between them. In the following section we will investigate this hiatus closer. Due to the external conditions of this text, we will make use of some already existing elaborations by scholars that could be situated in the tradition of radical democracy theory.

Recall that starting out with Maturana and Varela we elaborated the notion of vague matter which, linked to the opening of the possibility of self-interpretation and in close correspondence with sensibility (sensibility), actualizes a differentiation between power and potency. However, today we owe a further relational analysis of these two aspects. In

characteristic for French thought. This goes back to the Greek differentiation between *μη* and *ουκ*. While *μη* is the negation in relation (A child is not an adult but has the potential to become one), *ουκ* means nothingness or, in more abstract terms, contradiction (A child is not a stone and will in its being as such never become one.) The "no x" here refers to the transition from *μη* and *ουκ* and so deconstructs the metaphysic common sense, which in turn has always a political component. In our example this would mean to deconstruct the child as a consolidated, isolated entity, which in the wider sense is what we try to do here. Those being interested in more details, especially on that deconstruction of agency, are referred to the work of Jane Bennett *Vibrant Matter* (Durham NC: Duke University Press, 2010).

⁵² Ibid., 8ff. Rancier's notion will be very complex in a more detailed investigation. For him this "mass of men" in the foundation of the *δημος*, who "identify with the community in the name of the wrong by those whose position or qualities have the natural effect of propelling them into the nonexistence" (Ibid., 8) strongly focuses on the ancient development of the *πολις*. These city states emerged out of a social taxonomy of only a few men being legitimized to be possible citizens. Slaves, women, etc. were not included without any discussion. There was an absolutely different understanding of equality. So, equality was always understood as equality among the aristocratic stratum. Ranciere handles modern societies in the same manner, ignoring fundamental changes of possible equals. This could and should be discussed in a critical way. However, crucial for his analysis is the "wrong" out of which the *δημος* emerges. Meaning the idea of equality is always emerging out of a contingent and particular scope of hierarchy that claims to be universal. "Why is a river no legal person or a tree?" one could ask and this questions, like in the footnote before, the general hypothesis of distinctive, separable persons.

order to bring together the level of the social, the social taxonomy, and the level of the organisms, a closer look at the relationality of (biological) potency and (social) power is needed. After all, both are part of a democracy: communalized individuals ruling communally. Before we have a closer look at the connections, it must be emphasized that the point is not to uncover a first cause (*αρχή*) or a society before the individual, or an individual before the society. Rather, any analysis of this kind must look at an original dichotomy of individual and community.

Already when we worked out the three stages of the genesis of the organic, we started with one, but this one was a multiplicity, a manifoldness. By this manifoldness the vague matter becomes concrete, as a specific entanglement of potencies. The potency of the molecular actualizes by the potency of the cell, the potency of the cell actualizes by the structure of cells (metacellularity), and the potency of metacellularity actualizes by the potency of sensibility. The actualization of a potency is the *potentialization* of a potency, not an actualization of a consolidated being. This is no contradiction but describes the materiality of being from the point of view of becoming.

We want to call this the first aspect of an *immanence-manifoldness*. By the consolidation of organizations, according to this first aspect, a certain spectrum of potentiality remains coexistent. The *potentialization* of a potency, which is itself present as an organization in the *immanent manifoldness*, has in its structural constitution both an actuality (form of content) and a potentiality (possibility of expression). (Each molecule has a specific arrangement in space, a distribution of densities, etc., which in principle (potentially) allow for certain connections). Every potency is actual potentiality. Each potentiality is an actualization of potentially possible connections. Not into a final organizational structure, but again into a new structural configuration that has both actuality (form of content) and potentiality (possibility of expression).

But things are even more complicated (in the original sense). Specifically - as already indicated - the one organization of the manifold (molecule, cell, ...) does not replace the manifold, but rather, the organization clears by the manifold. This is due to the second, possibly more important aspect regarding the genesis of society. The *immanently manifold* allows for the formation of an infinite number of organizations without losing its multiplicity. An organization is an immanence level in the infinite chaos which we called the *immanently manifold*. These immanence levels can complicate themselves transversally and thus form new, more complicated organizations which again constitute the immanence level. The organism can be decomposed into cells and these again into molecules, but with each new degree of complexity there emerge qualities that are not explained

exhaustively by the less complicated levels. The problem known by the formula "the sum is greater than its parts" is currently keeping neuroscience on its toes. How can a dislocated network of neurons, representing a diagram of a division of labor, lead to the emergence of a self-consciousness that cannot be located in any of its parts?⁵³

Due to the second aspect, we can speak of parallel immanence levels from a certain degree of complexity which at the same time form a common immanence level. The molecule in the organism exists and does not exist at the same time. It leads a schizophrenic existence where it can never be quite sure what it is. Is it a member of a mitochondrial colloquium or a warrior in the military of the cell membrane when it maintains a connection with both, and sometimes does this or that, while its structure varies constantly?

In this sense, there are also societies (macro levels), but they are never conceivable without individuals (complicated micro levels). Nevertheless, the society is not the sum of its parts and vice versa, the individual is not a specific position in the macro level of society. Precisely because both are considered different levels one can speak of the big beast of society, but this body is not composed of many small bodies like Hobbes's Leviathan.

So there exists the macro level of society which has its own social taxonomy. On this level there is a perpetual, material, performative iteration of determining (acting) and experiencing (re-experiencing, along which a historicity unfolding and a concrete *nomos* becoming actual. Here again, determining and experiencing refer to the interaction of complicated micro-levels which consequently experience variations (the complicated level of the organism can vary structurally or even establish new transversal connections). This leads to a differentiation of the potencies of individuals which thus interact differently again. In parallel, on the macro level there is a sedimentation of the events of interaction, which in repetition stabilizes into a *nomos*. The macro-level is nothing more than an archive of failed or successful interaction either dislocated in the memories of individuals or organized by rites or documentation, or by the material design of a territory. In both cases they constitute a macro-level.

Let us make this clear by way of a simple example. The discovery of leverage opens the possibility for a community to generate such a large torque through a long lever arm that large masses can be moved with only a small amount of force. In this way, a material reshuffling of the milieu can occur. A community can build agricultural areas protected from the weather and from animals, e.g., by walls, because improved agricultural yields allow for more abundant nutrition.

The following generations, affected by this nutrition, can see through pure facts that they and their groups are stronger

⁵³ Cf. Antonio Damasio, *Self Comes to Mind: Constructing the Conscious Brain* (London: Vintage Books, 2012).

than others and that they are superior to these others in physical strength. It is now possible to connect this difference to a higher plan and to legitimize from it why the stronger ones should enrich those they consider to be weaker with higher insight and why they must therefore gain power over the weaker ones. Of course, the invention of such a plan would again be the expression of many different moments not only of torque. It would also need architectural knowledge, ways of understanding, etc. Nevertheless, the discovery and the sedimentation of these discoveries are both a condition and an enabling element for a certain coexistence of the immanent levels to actualize themselves.

The second stage of this example, when by means of the visibility of the different bodily expressions conclusions are legitimized regarding a hierarchy, when therefore the *de facto* (visibility) allows for the evidence for a judgment *de jure* (categories of being), there is a gap to the image of a social taxonomy that is merely an archive of the interactions in a community. Strictly speaking, a social taxonomy is an immanence level or a macro-level of power only when it has made this leap. It is in any case entirely questionable whether such a genesis from sediment to immanence level can capture anything essential at all. The *nomos* is an archive of rules and categories whose genealogy is grounded in a local practice, but to try to understand how a concrete *nomos* came to be will inevitably, ultimately lose itself behind the immanence levels of the molecular.

But if we complicate individuals in a macro-level to which at the same time they remain peculiarly external, how is this relationship to be understood? Previously we have separated between the levels of power and potency. With this complication of vague matter there came the possibility of design, of self-interpretation, and this through the new level of the imaginary. The macro-level is that level in which the visible gives itself and produces *sayability*. Archimedes sits down in the bathtub. After the anger about the water at the bottom has evaporated, volume and weight combine to form a sentence. If he had jumped up in anger and a wooden slat on the floor had come loose so that the next kick would easily lift the vase on the other end of the slat which three grown up men could only carry into the room while sweating, the length of the wood, the weight of the vase, and his weight might have connected. All this presupposes language, words, and concepts: everything has a weight, ever thing has a length, everything has a volume.

The complication of individuals in a macro level is a specific configuration in space and time and of space and time. How this is possible is not something we can delve into here. However, it is important that in this specific configuration visibility and *sayability* as such are actualized at each micro-level of an individual. The macro-level enables a kind of bond that allows for understanding the expression of another, and

both see this or that thing. But seeing does not refer to an original idea, as hearing does not refer to an original meaning but to the quasi-original sphere of ideas of the macro-level which is itself an image of sedimented interaction. Signifier and signified both refer to a complicated becoming of assemblages of vague matter.

Through the macro-level, vague matter is empowered, but on the other hand that archive that is the macro-level is kept alive. Here again we see the double figure of reproduction at work. The macro-level on the one hand is constantly reproduced by empowering micro-levels to take positions in it and interact according to the *nomos*. The micro-levels of the bodies on the other hand are the vague matter reproducing the *nomos*, yet not in the same way but according to their own potency. But what are the consequences of the process of empowerment for the vague matter, for the micro-levels of the bodies? For we must not get tired with emphasizing that the micro-levels are *partes extra partes* which do not compose, as *partes iuxta partes*, the whole of a macro-level. The body that occupies the position of the judge is no integral part of the whole but a judge-body, not just juridical subject or body being in and for itself. It is both at the same time: the judgement of the judge fills this body completely during its action, just as the body merges completely with the position of the judge. Even though both are one *hic et nunc*, they are different in real terms.

Now what happens when vague matter enters in the context of a community, ergo is empowered? First, we must realize that this empowerment is no lightning-like consummation. No micro-level of a vague matter folds in such a way that it becomes a full member of a community from one breath to the next. Learning of a language proceeds in stages, from the basic structures and basic vocabulary to the specialized areas, just as the customs at table progress from the basic rules to concrete problems (the elbow on the table, slurping, chewing with the mouth open).

Moreover, we must again accentuate the character of thrownness. Bodies are born into a world with a social taxonomy that has already become. They are not asked if they want to root there. The micro-level of bodies is already rooted in a macro-level, without ever having chosen this. They render blind obedience to the "One must...", "One speaks...", "One sees...", etc. of this macro-level without even knowing the difference between obedience and disobeying orders. The command that emanates from this macro-level of social taxonomy through the aspect of thrownness knows no other answer than "yes." For this "yes" manifests itself through the mere continued being of the body, i.e., the continued actual-being of this specific micro-level.

The empowered micro-levels of the bodies are inflicted with a decisive sting that folds them according to the range of variation of the macro-level (of possible visibilities, of possible

sayabilities). Since Foucault, we call this folding of the micro-level subjectification: this clitoris or that penis is still the same, but after being thrown it belongs to a female or male body.

By this example we see how immediately the macro-level machine gets to work. The doctor calls out only a few moments after the birth "It's a girl/boy!" And this is only the beginning of the macro-level regime of signs and visibility. It cranks up its many little machines, and in the micro-levels spaces of perception and expression are folded within the limits of the macro-level regime. Previously we called this the range of variation. And this implies the necessary permanence of the drift of the macro-level.

For, as we have said before, actualization is at the same time a new configuration of potencies. By the empowerment of micro-levels, micro and macro both overlap in such a way that ostensibly the macro-level dominates and the micro-level is shaped accordingly. And this is quite true from this point of view. The plurality of the clitoris or the penis is subjected to the totalitarian signifiers of the woman or the man. But with the folding of a specific micro-level, potencies actualize themselves, which are then possibly (not necessarily) transversal to the vectors of the macro-level.

Each position within the macro-level is not spanned by only one vector (signifier). Being a woman or a man is defined, besides the vector of sex for example, by vectors of other physical characteristics but also by specific vectors of behavior. It is in the latter that the potency of the micro-level comes more strongly into play. In education, some bodies exhibit immense resistance to dominant codes and schemas. Any actualization close to the border, that is, any behavior that is simply tolerated, for example by other vectors such as those of freedom and individuality, transforms at the same time the range of variation of the vector, ergo the vector of the macro-level itself. One hundred years ago, girls playing soccer were unthinkable, let alone real.

Of course, this is not merely due to variation through bodies. Intellectual discourses on the categories of the human being and the separation between biological and social gender opened a space for the variation of the space of women. And this is only one discourse that was at work. We see the complex workings of rules and codes at various macro-level positions that never persist without their micro-levels, which form their outside. At the same time they form the ground of permanent drifting, as the macro-level is instrumental for the folding of the micro-levels of the bodies.

And although now we have shown one way to the subversion of existing norms by means of the range of variation, at the same time there are subjectivizations that limit the body up to an unfortunately filled being. The mechanics of the part without share that we have outlined earlier would be an example of such a process. Interestingly,

in this context Ranciere says that the stratification of the macro-level into a democratic one is accompanied by an original injustice.⁵⁴ He is not alone with this diagnosis. Laclau also writes, “The recognition of the constitutive nature of this gap and its political institutionalization is the starting point of modern democracy”.⁵⁵ They do not mean that democracy is genuinely wrong or groundless with respect to the celestial sphere of the right or the reason of a state. They merely show the development of democratic taxonomy which emerged from a poly-differential process of contingent and local historicity. What is peculiar to the taxonomy of the democratic is that it makes this becoming its essence, by making it possible for the interests of individual micro-levels or groups of micro-levels to become universalized at the macro-level. As Laclau says, universalism, previously legitimized by for example, God's grace, becomes particularism where a hegemonization of interests leads to new injustice/suffering of other or new micro-levels so that a new movement of universalization begins to rise. But this always from the elements and vectors that span the macro-level.

Is this not that thesis we proposed with de(ma)cracy? *Δημοσ* is the name of a macro-level that determines its *nomos* in a contingent game. However, this *δημοσ* lags, because once it is expressed it already enters new micro-levels (content forms and thus acquires the drifting of itself. And what does the *δημοσ* enter? If it is an expression of a structure, it must also enter it again. Thus, we see the democratic process sketched as a drifting wherein substance (vague matter) and essence (*δημοσ*) mutually produce each other in a materially processual chiasmus. In short, de(ma)cracy. Implicitly, only the keeping open of this drifting is demanded if it should be called democracy in the future.

With the creation of a text there is always the reason for its necessity on the line. It is the question of sense if you grasp “sense” in a very vague and wide manner. This being-in-question is most of the time so silent that it is hardly perceivable. But if it comes down to the final passages of the text, the tone of asking rises. So, what is the meaning of this text? The most trivial answer would be: It is for the deduction of the notion “de(ma)cracy”. However, the process of writing and reading does not end with the definition and deduction of a notion. Writing is also a kind of emptying. Often it is the attempt to speak about things which could not be mentioned or discussed because in the moment of the notion and definition of these things they suddenly vanish.

Then, what is the use of writing anyway? Probably it is of quite little use, almost of no use at all. But as we have seen, the

⁵⁴ Rancière, op. cit., 6.

⁵⁵ Ernesto Laclau, *Emancipations* (London: Verso, 1996), 46.

very little could impose a huge difference, if it just finds the right lever. In the best instance, a philosophical text is not just an analytical work but obtains a transformation of horizon and understanding. And all this for the better? What is "better"? It is probably key to be aware of the importance of a counterpoint for anything being better. The necessity of at least two seems inevitable. Neither the macro-history of a socio-territorial taxonomy nor the *histologies* of bodies is better per se, but both constitute the other by a contingent process of becoming. From which injustice a society will have emancipated itself stays an open question without a final answer, but this is no loss of dignity for emancipation itself. Hopefully, just the opposite is true. Because if something like a ζῶον πολιτικόν should exist, it could not be less than the material becoming of a genuine pathos. This pathos is the experience of being thrown into the world and thus of being able to respond to this world in this world. Nobody was asked for this ability to respond. It is the bare *factum* of responsibility that is a sudden opening of the political. Behind this opening one will only find a yawning void. And what is the potential of the notion of democracy as de(ma)cracy? Much could not be discussed in this text, but this could hopefully give grounds for further discussion. Two examples are worth mentioning.

First, a further investigation of the becoming of a subject on this ground could be useful. Especially in a neoliberal context, this implies the question of property and the foreign: of mine and yours. How much of me is to be found with this "I" that I call my own, and how much do I contribute to my own self-fulfillment or to myself becoming an "I" of the American dream.

Second, the notion of vague matter implies the question: "Who or what could be considered an agent?" One inspiration for this notion was Jane Bennet's *Vibrant Matter*. Another was Latour's idea of the "actant".⁵⁶ Both conceptions differentiate classical conceptions of the actor which are restricted to human beings.

Let us close, however, with a final reference from *Crowd and Power*. He devotes an entire chapter to the "sting" that, through the underlying threat of death in every command, penetrates the instructed.⁵⁷ On the premise that learning a language is not "to be believed, but to obey and to compel obedience",⁵⁸ Deleuze and Guattari elaborate that this sting forms "a cyst, a hardening [...] that never goes away".⁵⁹ For Canetti himself, however, there is a way to rid oneself of the sting of command. He calls it "reversal".⁶⁰ "Everything that makes [a man] recognizable will change sooner than the shape

⁵⁶ Cf. Bruno Latour, *We Have Never Been Modern* (New York, New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993).

⁵⁷ E. Canetti, E. and C. Stewart, *Crowds and Power* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2021), 383-426.

⁵⁸ *A Thousand Plateaus*, op. cit., 7.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.* 525.

⁶⁰ Canetti and Stewart, op. cit., 388.

of the command which has lodged in [man] a sting and which is preserved unaltered until he himself produces it again. But the occasion has to be there; the new situation which releases the command must be the exact replica of the situation in which it was received."⁶¹ This reversal occurs through the exchange of the positions of commander and commanded. However, this does not necessarily take place on the level of commander-commanded but can also take place on the genuine level of the threat of death and its execution. The form of such a reversal is found in the formation of a "reversal crowd".⁶² Canetti himself describes the reversal crowd as liberation from the "most monstrous" stings which can only appear by the constant repetition of orders by different commanders.⁶³

With Canetti we have described the development of crowds as trans-substantiations where the tremendous quantum leads to a transformation of quality. Commands are crucial for modern society and their social taxonomies. Canetti describes the crowd as a phenomenon of the modern epoch which did not emerge in the times of packs. Is it a phenomenon of nationality though? Is there a monster slumbering in every nation, which eventually devours its whole habitat? Like cancer being able to destroy the whole organism? One must admit that instances of cancer have increased rapidly in modern, western societies under a neoliberal horizon where everything is schematized and therefore determinable. Under a horizon of food supplementation, the genetic manipulation of food, with the inherent and prominent urge to grow, with the belief in growth, in exponential growth, like the amounts of pollutants in the air.

Probably this analogy between cancer and crowds is useful for showing how vague matter resists a macro policy that tries bringing the whole world to one denominator. The binary option offers either order or chaos. There is nothing in-between. We find that by the so-called pleas for saving the planet we hear so often nowadays on the political stage. A more accurate wording would be "saving humankind," and this does not include all human lives but only those lives as proving their humanity by their nationality. Although this description uncovers an abyss, we should not ignore the motivation of all these pleas, specifically, reading it as an expression of an individual *conatus*.

Consequently, we want to offer a re-formulation: Should something like the human life stay in its becoming, we may not forget the Singular-Plural of life which means a process of permanent re-stratification, by which the individuals have a life. Life means public orders and individual orders coexisting and thus allowing for the emergence of binarity. These

⁶¹ Op. cit.,

⁶² Op. cit., 419.

⁶³ Op. cit.

order(s) are also orders which call for responsibility, for an ongoing response-ability. This should probably also be a plea for an ongoing response to life in life with no last word. Or like some Jewish traditions say: "If the Messiah is someone, he is the wrong one."